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cultural roots from Europe, Africa, Asia, and
Latin America.
But many other causes are invoked as well,
rightly or wrongly, for explaining the failure
of the American school system: too much
emphasis on sports; overburdened and
underpaid teachers; decisions on how and
what  to  teach  left  to  local  school  boards;
politization of textbooks; and so on and so
forth.
May be all of the above contribute to the
appalling  results,  but  I  think  it  is  the
choice  of  an  epistemology,  a  theory  of
knowledge, that  is  counterproductive,  even
inhibitory,  to  the  cognitive  processes  of
appreciation,   fascination,   enthusiasm,
curiosity,  etc.,  that are  prerequisite  for
learning  and understanding.
Let  me  take  as  an  example  again  the
report  to  the  California  State  Board  of
Education I mentioned before. On its almost
200  pages  there  is  not  a  single  sentence
that addresses the  questions  of  how  do
students  learn, what   takes   place   in   the
mind of the learner and what this gigantic
machinery  we  call  "schooling"  is  all  about.
Indeed, what is learning?
If  this  question  is  asked  in  an  academic
context say, in departments of education or
psychology there will be many answers.
However,  if  this  question  is  asked  in  an
operational context, there are no answers at
all: we have not the slightest idea of what is
going on within us when we say we have
learned something.
I was very impressed by the courage of the
organizers to invite Americans, namely my
colleagues  and  me,  to  this  symposium  on
education, though it is well known that the
United  States  of  America  have  one  of  the
worst educational systems of the Western
world.
Let  me  read  from  the  May  1989  Edition
of  the  Review  Draft  by  the  Curriculum
Commission to be submitted to the California
State Board of Education (1):
..."In 1983, A Nation at Risk declared that
American education had become victim to a
rising tide of mediocrity. The National Science
Boards Commission an Precollege Education
in  Mathematics,  Science  and  Technology
confirmed   that   the   situation   in   science
education   was   particularly   critical   and
recent   studies   have   placed   Americas
students  last  among  their  internacional
counterparts in understanding science. In
1988, the National Assessment of Educational
Progress of the Educational Testing Service
issued The Science Report  Card,  and  noted
that  while  the responses in the intervening
years since 1983 have  resulted  in  some
progress, average science proficiency across
the grades remains distressingly low."
Perhaps  we  have  been  invited  to  find  out
how  not  to  set  up  an  educacional  system.
Why   indeed   does   American   education
function so poorly?
To start with, there is great difficulty in
setting up an educacional strategy in a
pluralistic society with a population of diverse
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explain  our mathematical abilities, perhaps
with   special   organelles   for   addition,
subtraction and multiplication.
These  and  similar  notions  fall  into  the
category  of  "explanatory  principles",  a
category which was invented by Gregory
Bateson to answer "What is..." -questions from
his daughter (2). When she asked: "Daddy,
what is an instinct?", he answered: "An
instinct, my dear, is an explanatory principle."
And when she wondered what does it explain,
he said: "Anything - olmost anything at all.
Anything you want it to explain." When she
protests that it could not explain gravity
Bateson retorts; "But that is because nobody
wants instinct to explain gravity. If they did,
it would explain it. We could simply say that
the moon has an instinct whose strength
varies  inversely  with  the  square  of  the
distance...", whereupon she stops him: "But
this is nonsense!" and he: "But it was you who
mentioned instinct, not I", etc.
I  leave  it  to  you  to  follow  up  on  these
charming "Metalogues" as Bateson called
them; my point here is to draw your attention
to such stopgaps of inquiry of which there
are, besides "language organs", "instincts"
many others, e.g., "drives", "mind", "memory"
(3), etc., etc. They always come handy when
we do not know what is going an.
With the following example, however, I would
like to invite you to come with me to the
brink  of  the  abyss  of  our  fundamental
ignorance,  and  to  stand  with  me  in  awe
before the vastness of this void.
I take this example from a book by the
psychiatrist   Oliver   Sacks   The   Man   Who
I mean by that that here we are all walking
talking and socializing ever since we were
about two years of age, although we never
took courses in our mother tongue nor in the
art of locomotion. There were no curricula
regarding these faculties, and we have no idea
how we acquired them.
Indeed, what is learning?
If this question is asked in an academic
context  say,  in  departments  of  education
or psychology there will be many answers.
However, if this question is asked in an
operational context, there are no answers at
all: we have not the slightest idea of what
is going on within us when we say we have
learned something.
The denotative school of language acquisition
will  argue  that  we  understand  very  well
how we learn to speak, namely, by imitating
those  who  point  to  things  and  make  the
appropriate  noises.  But  I  learned  from
Margaret Mead, the anthropologist, who
easily picked up colloquial language of the
many different tribes she worked with, that
this is not so. Once she used this method by
pointing to different things hoping to learn
how to call them. To her dismay she always
got the same answer "chumumula". First she
thought they have a very primitive language
until she found out that "chumumula" means
pointing with ones finger.
The Noam Chomsky school of thought will
argue,  that  we  know  very  well  how  we
learn  to  speak,  namely,  by  activating  a
"language  organ"  that  is  grown  into  our
body.  Following  this  train  of  thought  I
would  propose  a mathematical  organ"  to
• 16 •
Lethology: A Theory of Learning and Knowing vis à vis Undeterminables, Undecidables, Unknowables
Mistook His Wife for a Hat (4). Among the
many cases of the astounding functioning of
"dysfunctional" minds, the most fascinating
for me is his report about a pair of twins he
once  met  in  a  state  hospital,  John  and
Michael, who were variously diagnosed as
autistic, psychotic, or severly retarded. Here is
his description: "They are... unattractive at
first encounter, a sort of Tweedledum and
Tweedledee, indistinguishable, mirror images,
identical in face, in body movements, in
personality, in mind, identical too in their
stigmata of brain and tissue damage. They are
undersized, with disturbing disproportions in
head and hands, high-arched palates, high-
arched feet, monotonous squeaky voices, a
variety  of  peculiar  tics  and  mannerisms,
and  a  very  high,  degenerative  myopia,
requiring  glasses  so  thick  that  their  eyes
seem distorted, giving  them  the  appearance
of   absurd   little   professors,   peering   and
pointing,  with  a   misplaced,  obsessed,  and
absurd concentration."
When he first met them, they were already
known as having a remarkable "documentary"
memory, that enabled them, for instance, to
say at once on what day of the week a date
far in the past or future would fall.
However, he did not think about them, until
he  had  another  encounter  of  which  he
writes:  "I  forgot  [them]  until  a  second,
spontaneous scene, a magical scene, which I
blundered into, completely by chance."
"The  second  time  they  were  seated  in  a
corner together, with a mysterious, secret
smile  on  their  faces,  a  smile  I  had  never
seen  before,  enjoying  the  strange  pleasure
and peace they now seemed to have. I crept up
quietly so as not to disturb them. They seemed
to be locked in a singular, purely numerical,
converse.  John  would  say  a number, a six-
figure number. Michael would catch the
number, nod, smile and seem to savour it. He,
in turn, would say another six-figure number,
and now it was John who received and
appreciated it richly. They looked, at first, like
two connoisseurs wine-tasting, sharing  rare
tastes,  rare  appreciations.  I sat  still,  unseen
by  them,  mesmerised, bewildered."
"What were they doing? What on earth was
going on?" Oliver Sacks asked himself. But
since he is not only a psychiatrist but also a
numbers  buff, he  could  provide  at  least  a
clue:  while  the  twins  were  playing  their
game  with  numbers,  he  wrote  them  down
and looked them up later at home in a book
that lists all prime numbers up to nine-figure
primes. Prime numbers are those peculiar
islands floating in the infinite sea of numbers
that do not evenly divide by any number but
by themselves or one. To his amazement, his
hunch was correct: all the six-figure numbers
the  twins  exchanged  were  primes!  This
persuaded him to join them the next day, and
equipped with his prime number book he
presented  them  with  an  eight-figure  prime:
"... They  both  turned  towards  me,  then
suddenly became still, with a look of intense
concentration and perhaps wonder on their
faces. There was a long pause - the longest I
had ever known them to make, it must have
lasted a half-minute or more - and then
suddenly, simultaneously, they both broke
into smiles."
Now all three were playing the game, with the
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prime numbers getting larger and larger, until
the twins were coming up with numbers
much larger than those in the book. When
they moved on, swapping twenty-figure
numbers,   Oliver   Sacks   could   only   sit
in amazement, watching an unfathomable
prime-numbers-ping-pong   game,   and
contemplating unfathomability.
From  this  example  I  learned  at  least  one
thing,  namely,  that  we  generally  do  not
appreciate our own miraculous faculties when
they work. We are, however, surprised when
they  dont  work  in  the  usual  way  and
manifest themselves in other forms. Since
there is not the smallest handle in sight with
which  to  grasp  the  enigmatic  behavior  of
the  twins,  I  claim  we  are  precisely  in  the
same  situation  when  we  wish  to  grasp
our own.
Vis  à  vis  this  enigma  and  vis  à  vis  our
ignorance and, paradoxically, vis à vis our
sense  of  knowing,  I  thought  about  an
epistemology,  a  theory  of  knowledge,  that
is cognizant of the vastness of our ignorance,
a  tip-of-the-iceberg  epistemology  that  is
aware of its floating state of affairs.
May be one could call this a development for
a calculus of un-knowables, or a theory of
un-knowledge, but I was unhappy with the
negative connotation implied by the prefix
"un-", and I looked for a word that would
refer to the absence of a faculty in a positive
sense, as blindness is "un-seeing" or deafness
is "un-hearing".
Neither in Greek nor in Latin I could find what
I was looking for, and I was on the verge of
giving  up  my  search,  when  I  remembered
that "truth", believed by many today to have
a positive  sense, had  a  negative  connotation
in  ancient  Greece: "Aletheia",  or  "that  which
is  not  obscured",  with  the  prefix  "a"  for
"not", and "letheia" from "lanthano" to "hide"
to "obscure". It is the river Lethe, you may
recall, one crosses to enter Elysium and all
memories  vanish,  while  crossing  the  river
Acheron all memories are reinforced before
entering Hades, so that they haunt you ad
infinitum.
Thus Lethe offeres itself naturally for naming
a calculus of unknowables "Lethology", and I
am going to use this calculus as a rigorous
platform for discussing the problems I
mentioned before.
I see within unknowables two components:
undeterminables and undecidables; thus I shall
address these in the following two points:
l. How to deal with systems that are in
principle undeterminable; and
2. How to answer questions that are in
principle undecidable.
Thus Lethe offeres itself naturally for
naming  a  calculus  of  unknowables
"Lethology", and I am going to use this
calculus  as  a  rigorous  platform  for
discussing  the  problems  I  mentioned.
l. UNDETERMINABLES
"Causality  determines  the  flow  of  events
in   the   universe"   is   one   of   the   central
beliefs  in  our  Western  culture.  It  is  the
belief that if we were to understand the Laws
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of Nature we would understand the world:
our quest, therefore, is to determine these
Laws.
While skeptics argued for over two and a half
millenia against this belief, I would like to
report about some other arguments in the
same  direction  that  were  developed  over
only the last fifty years by logicians and
mathematicians who studied the fundamental
principles,  functions,  and  operations  of
systems  in  general,  because  the  results  of
these studies have a direct bearing on the
central themes of our symposium, namely,
cognition, education, and learning.
Although  I  shall  discuss  theoretical  aspects
of  these  notions,  there  is  no  need  to  go
through logico-mathematical acrobatics that
would be hard to follow by the uninitiated.
Thanks to an elegant intellectual twist
invented by the British mathematician Alan
Turing (5), we can leave all the cumbersome
derivations, deductions, inferences, etc., to a
(conceptual) "machine", and can comfortably
sit  back  and  watch  the  machine  grinding
out  answers  for  our  illumination  and
contemplation.
A  "machine"  in  this  context  is  a  set  of
rules by which some state of affairs are
transformed into some other state of affairs.
For our purpose it is sufficient to distinguish
only two kinds of such machines: one, usually
referred to as "trivial machine", has only one
fixed rule that operates without change on the
various state of affairs; the other one, the
"non-trivial machine", having rules which,
however,  change  the  rules  that  operate  an
the  state  of  affairs:  a  machine  within  a
machine,  a  "second order  machine",  so  to
say.
To make these notions more tangible let me
first  construct,  or  synthesize,  a  typical
trivial  machine  whose  "state  of  affairs"
consists  of  only  the  first  four  letters  of
the alphabet A, B, C, D, and whose "rule of
transformation" is to associat (anagramma-
tically) each state (letter) with one in the
opposite   sequence   D,   C,   B,   A.  If   one
presents  this  "anagrammor  with,  say,  a
"B",   it   will   respond   wih   a   "C",   and -
mutatis mutandis- will do so in perpetuity.
As   you   will   see   at   once,   the   trivial
machine  is  one  of  the  central  pillars  of
Western thought (6). Take, for instance, the
mini-universe of the four letters of before,
together  with  the  anagrammatic  rule  of
transformation as metaphor for a universe
with  four  states  of  affairs  and  the
transformation rule as its Law of Nature.
Then  with  A, B, C, D,  as  causes  and  D,
C, B, A  as  effects,  causality  is  now
determining  the  flow  of  events  in  this
Universe;  or  take  a  transformation  rule
as  the  property  of  an  organism,  then
certain  stimuli  will  elicit  the  appropriate
responses;  or   take   the   character   of   a
person  as  a  transformation  rule,  then  his
or her motives will entail their corresponding
actions;  or  look  at  computer  science  where
the  transformation  rule  is,  of  course,  the
program  computing  from  its  inputs  the
appropriate outputs.
The underlying triadic structure of all these
examples is that of logical syllogisms with
their two premisses and their inescapable
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conclusion.  This  structure  is  also  embedded
in  our  language  through  the  words
"because",  "in  order  to",  and  "for",  usually
with an unspoken reference to an immutable
rule. However, remember when I proposed in
my earlier example a partircular
transformation rule, a Law of Nature, it was
my choice. In other words, I was playing God
for this Universe, for I could have chosen
other Laws, for instante replacing each letter
with its follower (and D with A); or pulling
the four resulting letters out of a hat, letting
chance determine the Laws of Nature (in
contrast to other beliefs (7)). etc., etc.
It is important to see the considerable freedom
we have in synthesizing these machines. But
it is also important to see that if we do not
know  their  workings  we  can  through
examination identify the operations of such
machines. One has simply to go through all
available states (A, B, C, D) and pair them
with their responses (say, D, A, B, C): then the
pairs AD, BA, CB, DC, identify this
anagrammatic  machine,  for  they  are  the
"machine".
In  other  words,  trivial  machines  are  not
only  determined  through  their  synthesis,
they are also determinable through analysis.
Morover, since their operating rules remain
unchanged,  i.e.,  they  are  historically
independent, thay are also predictable!
lt was apparently this insight that prompted
Laplace almost 200 years ago to make his
paradigmatic statement (8) that if for a
superhuman intelligence the present conditions
of  all  particles  in  the  universe  would  be
known "... nothing would be uncertain and the
future and the past would be present to his
eyes." Today Laplace would rejoyce: "The
Universe: a trivial machine!"
I  am  sorry  to  say, mon  cher  Pierre Simon
Marquis de Laplace, you rejoyced too early.
This is the appropriate moment to turn to
non-trivial machines. As I described them
before,  they  are  changing  their  operating
rules  according  to  a  "second  order"  rule,
a  "program".  Such  a  program  may  be
seen as operating on "internal states of affairs",
the operating rules of before, namely, those
that  operate  on  the  "external  states  of
affairs". To stay with the earlier example of
the "anagrammor", we are now changing the
anagrams  according  to  the  program  that
specifies a particular non-trivial machine.
If  we  contemplate  changing  one  anagram
into another, we have to know the anagrams
at our disposal. Referring again to our 4-letter
universe (A,B,CD), then, depending on whether
we allow different letters (say, A, B) to be
translated into like letters (say, A-C; B-C) or
not, we have with 4-Letter anagrams for the
two cases (see Appendix (Apx)):
Nlike  =  256 anagrams
Ndiff  =    24 anagrams
For the purpose of constructing now a non-
trivial  machine,  I  have  listed  (Apx)  and
numbered all 24 anagrams possible with all
four letters different; and for the purpose of
demonstrating the workings of such a
machine I picked for the "internal states of
affairs" the four anagrams #10, 17, 19, 24,
where  #24  you  may  recognize  as  the  one
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used in the example for the trivial machine:
10  17 19  24
A  C D  D
C  D A  C
D  A B  B
A  B C  A
In  fact,  whenever  our  to  be  constructed
machine stays in any one of these internal
states, it acts as a trivial machine according
to that anagrammatic rule.
Now we are in a position to select the
program  that  will  run  our  machine;  this
program determines the letters X and the
rules (anagrams) R that follow after the
machine operated on letter X and under rule
R. For this demonstration I chose the following
program of operations:
TRANSITION TABLE
      R
R = 10 R = 17 R = 19 R = 24
 X´  R´  X´ R´  X´ R´  X´  R´
 B B 10 C 17 D 19 D  24
 B C 17 D 19 A 24 C  10
X
 C D 19 A 24 B 10 B  17
 D A 24 B 10 C 17 A  19
Example: Assume the machine is in a state in
which it computes for A, B, C, D the anagram
#10 (B, C, D, A), and is presented with the
letter B (X=B); of course, it will produce C
(X=C), but at the same time it will change the
anagrammatic rule from #10 (R=10) to #17
(R=17). Hence, if given B again, we have to
look under R=17 and find the response to be
D instead of C as before! Since the machine has
moved now into #19, B again produces A, etc.,
etc. Below is for a repeated sequence of  A,  B,
C,  D  (first  line)  the  sequence  of responses
(second line):
A, B, C, D, A, B, C, D, .....
B, C, A, A, D, A, B, B, .....
I  hope  these  examples  are  sufficient  to
demonstrate  the  fundamental  difference
between these machines and their trivial
sisters. However, when the Transition Table of
above is given, the determination of any
sequence is now trivial. Why then calling
these machines non-trivial? This will become
obvious when we do not know the program
or transformation rules, and have to identify
them through experimentation.
Before planning such an experimental
procedure it would be wise to estimate the
effort that has to go into, solving the
identification problem. This effort depends, of
course, upon our knowledge of the system.
Let us assume we know that the program
works (as in our example) with exactly 4
anagrammatic rules and the alphabet consists
of precisely 4 letters; then the number of
different machines, one of which is the one we
want to identify, is precisely (Apx):
N4  =  4,294,967,296.
This looks like a large number, but with large
number-crunching computers that may test
one million of our possible machines in one
second, it  takes  perhaps  not  more  than  1
hour and 15 minutes to have our machine
identified. But let us assume now that we do
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not know that only 4 anagrammatic rules (i.e.,
Laws of Nature) are operative, but we do
know that this universe has the property that
two different "causes" will never result in like
"effects", then the number of possible
universes, of which ours is only one, is (Apx):
N24  =  6.3 x 10
57.
Since the large computer of before can test
only  about  thirty  trillion  (i.e. 30x1012)
machines per year, and the universe we are
living  in  is  at  most  only  20  billion  (i.e.,
20xlO9) years old, it is much too young to
have tested only a fraction of the possibilities
large enough to be mentioned.
But our ignoranse may run deeper. Since
distinguishing difference in causes and
difference in effects is a question of cognitive
skills, we cannot be certain that the canon
"different  cause/different  effect"  is  valid  for
the universe under investigation. Hence we
have  to  be  prepared  to  look  for  the  one
sample out of (Apx)
N256 = 5 x 10
616.
This is a number with 616 zeros following 5.
Clearly, the identification problem of non-
trivial machines is non-trivial or, as it is put
in the language of computer scientists, it is
"transcomputational". Translated back into
common language: it cant be done!.
Optimists,  nevertheless,  may  argue  that
sooner or later we will have the theoretical or
technical  means  available  to  tackle  this
problem. Unfortunately, however, this hope is
unfounded. It can be shown (9) that there are
machine configurations whose identity cannot,
in principle, be established by a finite sequence
of experiments: the machine identification
problem is in principle unsolvable!
While  non-trivial  machines  can  be  synthe-
tically   determined,   they   are   analytically
undeterminable,   history   dependent,   and
unpredictable.
It takes a long time for this insight to sink in,
for it contradicts all the intuitive notions we
have of Natures magnificent order, of the
reliability of our friends and of a coherent
sense of ourselves. Shall we doubt the non-
triviality of all this?
When I ask my friends whether or not they
consider themselves to be trivial or non-trivial
"machines", they unequivocally opt for non-
triviality,  although  when  asked  of  their
opinion  about  others,  the  answers  are
mixed. This should not surprise, because in
comparison to the fickle, unpredictable, and
unanalyzable non-trivial machine, the trivial
machine with its reliability and predictability
appears to be a gift from Paradise. We pay
considerable  sums  of  money  for  garantees
that  the  machines  we  buy  are  not  only
trivial when we buy them but maintain their
triviality for a long period of time. When one
morning our car refuses to start, its history
dependent, non-trivial, true nature comes to
the fore, and we have to call a professional
trivialisateur who, with his tools re-establishes
the cars apparent trivality.
It is clear that we as children of our culture
are  infatuated  with  trivial  systems  and
whenever  things  do  not  go  the  way  we
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think they should go we will trivialize them:
then they become predictable.
I have discussed this point at length, because
at some uneasy moments I sense that in the
absence of an understanding of how to deal
with one of the most non-trivial, inventive
surprising, unpredictable creatures I know of,
our  children,  some  educational  systems
confuse  learning  with  trivialization.  In
learning, the number of internal states grows
and  the  semantic  relational  structure  (the
"program") becomes richer. Trivialization, on
the other hand, means  amputation  of
internal states, blocking the evolution of
independent  thought  and  rewarding
prescribed, hence predictable, behavior:  "6"  is
the answer to the question "What is 2x3?";
unacceptable is: "an even number", "3x2", "my
age", and others (10).
This begs the question of the meaning of
"tests".  Are  tests  designed  to  establish  the
workings  of  another  mind,  the  mind  of
the   student?  Then   tests   try   to   establish
the  impossible,  for  as  we  know  now,  the
mind of a non-trivial student is analytically
indeterminable.  Are  tests  designed  to
establish the degree of success an educational
system had in trivializing its students? Then
the results do not reflect upon the malleability
of  students  but  upon  the  educational
system and the tests it designs. That is:
tests test tests,
(and not those supposedly tested)
examinations examine the examiner, not the
examined. This becomes evident when we see
students study exams in order to pass exams,
which is not the same as to study the subject
matter to know the subject matter. But then
the question arises of how do we know what
they know of the subject matter? Indeed, how
do we know? Or, in this context, how do we
know vis à vis unknowables? Or, using the
concept of non-trivial systems, what is it that
we  may  know  about  them,  if  we  cannot
know about their workings?
This begs the question of the meaning of
"tests".  Are  tests  designed  to establish
the workings of another mind, the mind of
the student? Then tests try to establish the
impossible, for as we know now, the mind
of  a  non-trivial  student  is  analytically
indeterminable. Are  tests  designed  to
establish  the  degree   of   success   an
educational system had in trivializing its
students? Then the results do not reflect
upon the malleability of students but upon
the educational system and the tests it
designs.  That  is:  tests  test  tests,  (and
not those supposedly tested).
25 years ago this question was either not
asked, rejected when asked, or one thought
about developing methods of trivialization.
However, within these years the pursuit of
two  ideas  changed  fundamentally  the
approach to this question, One of these ideas
evolved in mathematics where the notion of
non-triviality  was  translated  into  non-
linearity,  which  brought  forth  a  colorful
bouquet of surprises and amazements under
the names of non-linear dynamics and chaos
theory; the other one grew within systems
and computer science, where the cybernetic
notion  of  circularity  and  closure  brought
forth   a   wealth   of   new   insights   and
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perspectives.
Let  me  first  address  the  notions  of
circularity  and  closure,  for  these  are
notions  that  were  avoided  by  orthodox
science. What is meant by circularity is that
the outcome of the operation of a system
initiates  the  next  operation  of  that  system:
the system and its operations are a "closed
system". This is to allow that an experimenter
considers  her- or  himself  as  part  of  the
experiment;  or  that  a  family  therapist
perceives  of  him  or  herself  as  a  partner
of the family; or that a teacher sees her- or
himself   as   participant   in   the   learning/
teaching  process  in  the  classroom,  etc.,
etc.
To  see  the  unorthodoxy  of  closure,  i.e.,
including the actor into the actors universe,
one should remember Laplace, who did not
think of himself being a part of his universe,
otherwise  he  would  not  have  declared  it
to  be  a  trivial  machine,  or  think  of
"objectivity":  it  demands  that  the  properties
of  the  observer  shall  not  enter  into  the
description  of  his  observations.  I  ask  how
can  this  be  done?  Without  him  there
would be no description nor any observation.
I shall now report on the fast developing field
of non-linear dynamics, where circularity and
closure are essential ingredients. There are
three results that are here of fundamental
significance. The one is that if one lets a closed
system operate recursively on its outcome, it
will sooner or later, converge to a stable
behavior.  Because  of  the  short  history  of
this  development,  these  dynamic  equilibrio
are by different people given different names:
"fix points",  attractors",  "strange  attractors",
and "eigen-behaviors" (11). I shall demonstrate
these dynamic stabilities in a moment, after I
have  accounted  for  the  other  fascinating
results of these studies. One of them is that
the  initial  condition  of  some  systems
determine their behavior in a crucial way:
they may under one condition assume one,
two, or more different forms of eigen-
behaviors  or  under  another  condition,  will
go on and on without ever going into any
form of stability: they become chaotic! One of
the surprising observations here is that
frequently  the  two  initial  states  which
separate  the  systems  behavior  into
convergence  to  stability  or  into  divergence
to chaos can be infinitesimally apart: even
systems  whose  rules  of  operation  are
known may be unpredictable!
An example shall clarify these points. Let us
operate  recursively  the  non-trivial  machine
of  before  offering  it  the  letter  "A",  and
asuming  it  to  be  in  the  initial  state  of
computing anagram  #10 (A/10). From the
Transition Table (page 8) we see the response
to  be  B/10. B/10  now  recursively  re-enters
the machine to produce C/17 and, recursively
A/24,  and  so  on  and  so  forth.  Below  is
the sequence of the first 17 events (top row
letter/bottom row number of state):
A, B, C, A, D, A, D, C,
A,D, A, D, C, A, D, A, D, ...
10 10 17 24 24 19 19 17 24 24 19 19 17 24 24 19 19, ...
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As  can  be  seen,  after  a  transient  period
of  only  two  steps  (A, B),  the  machine
converges to a dynamic stability that
manifests itself in producing periodically the
sequence CADAD, the eigen-behavior  of  this
machine  under  the  chosen  initial  condition.
Let  us  try  another experiment by starting
with a condition that did not appear in the
previous run, say C/24:
C, B, D, C, A, D, A, D,
24 17 19 17 24 24 19 19
There,  after  3  transient  steps  (C, B, D)  the
system  assumes  a  stable  dynamics,  the
eigen-behavior  of  before:  CADAD,  CADAD
appears, so to say, to be the manifestation of
this  machines  inner  workings  which,  for
those  who  do  not  know  it,  will  remain
an unknowable for ever.
I leave it to the curious among you to find out
whether  the  machine  so  assembled  is
capable  of  other  dynamic  stabilities,  or
whether  CADAD  is  the  only  thing  it  can
say of itself.
I shall go on to generalize these observations
in three steps. The first is to give without
proof the essence of a theorem concerning
these machines. It says that an arbitrarily
large closed network of recursively interacting
non-trivial machines can be treated as a single
non-trivial machine operating on itself, as, for
instance, the machine in our example. This
insight entails the second point, namely, that
the  dynamics  between  all  interacting
participants in such a network will converge
to a stable dynamics, to the eigen-behavior of
this network. The third step, or should I call
it a leap, now follows: Let the interacting
participants be the participants in a social
network, then their eigen-behavior manifests
itself in the language spoken, the objects
named, the customs maintained, the rituals
observed. Embedded in this network are the
"teachers" and the "students" who, through
their  dialogue,  establish  an  understanding,
not  of  each,  but  of  each other  where  a
subject matter may be the vehicle for this
understanding, for learning how to learn.
How this comes to pass is unknowable; but
that it comes to pass is because of our doing
it together in a recursive dialogue. Here is
what Martin Buber has to say (12).
"Contemplate the human with the human, and
you will see the dynamic duality, the human
essence, together: here is the giving and the
receiving, here the agressive and the defensive
power, here the quality of searching and
responding, always both in one, mutually
complementing in alternating action,
demonstrating together what it is: to be
human. Now you can turn to the single one
and you recognize him as human for his
potencial of relating; then look at the whole
and recognize the human for his richness of
relating. We may come closer to answering
the question: what is a human?, when we
come to understand him as the being in whose
dialogic in his mutual present two-getherness,
the encounter of the one with the other is
realized at all times.
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2. UNDECIDABLES
There are among propositions, problems,
questions, etc., those that are decidable and
those that are in priciple undecidable.
Decidable, for instance, is the question
whether 3,536,712 is, without remainder,
divisible by 5. The answer is clearly a "No";
however,  if  we  had  asked  "divisible  by  2?",
the answer clearly is "Yes". One could, of
course invent more difficult questions, very
difficult  questions,  extraordinary  difficult
questions that may take years to decide, but
in the pursuit of answering them we are
assured of their decidability because of our
choice  of  the  rules  how  to  climb  from
one  node  in  this  crystalline  structure  of
logico-mathematical  relations  to  the  next
one.
This  is  why  for  example  mathematicians
are,  after  250  years,  still  trying  to
"proof", that is, to give explicit instructions to
the climbers of how to procede, a conjecture
that Christian Goldbach wrote in 1742 in a
letter  to  Leonard  Euler.  Goldbach  had  the
hunch  that  every  even  number  can  be
representad  by  the  sum  of  two  primes,
as,  for  instance,  12 = 5+7,  or  16 = 13+3,
etc., etc.
Indeed every even number tried so far can be
decomposed into two primes but this is, of
course, not a proof! In other words, the
question: "Is Goldbachs conjecture provable?"
is not (yet) decided. By inserting the three
letters  "yet"  in  the  previous  sentence
decidability  is  stipulated.  But  with  Kurt
Godels observation in 1931 that within our
mathematical system there are undecidable
propositions  (13),  the  suspicion  arises  that
Goldbachs conjecture may be one of them
(14).
But there is no need to participate in logico-
mathematical somersaults to appreciate the
appearance of in principle undecidable
questions for everyday language and lore is
laced with them. Take the question of the
origin of our Universe: how did it come
about? Clearly, this question is in principle
undecidable,  for  there  could  not  be  any
witnesses, and if there were, who would
believe them. Nevertheless, there are many
answers  to  this  question.  Some  say  it  was
the  union  of  Chaos  with  Darkness  that
brought  forth  all  there  is;  others  say  it
was a singular act of creation some 4000
years ago; others insist that there was no
beginning and there is no end because the
universe is in a perpetuos dynamic equilibrium
an  "eigen-universe";  still  others  argue  that
the  whole  thing  began  10  or  20  billion
years ago with a Big Bang, whose noise can
still be heard as a whisper over large radio
antennas; I have not yet accounted for the
answers Hindus, Arapesht Massaist Nubas,
Khmersp Bushmen, etc., etc., would give when
asked  this  question.  In  other  words,  tell
us how the Universe began, and we tell you
who you are.
The  distinction  between  decidable  and  in
principle undecidable questions may be now
sufficiently    clear,   that    I    can    present
to  you the following thesis (15):
"Only those questions that are in principle
undecidable, we can decide".
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Why?
Simply  because  decidable  questions  are
already  decided  by  the  choice  of  the
framework  within  which  they  are  asked.
The frame work itself may however, have
been an answer we chose to an in principle
undecidable  question.  This  observation
sharpens the distinction between these two
kinds  of  question:  answers  to  decidable
questions  are  forced  through  necessity,
while for those to undecidable questions we
have the freedom to choose. But with this
freedom of choice we must assume the
responsibility for our choice. This sharpens
further  the  distinction  between  these
questions: procedures for arriving at answers
to decidable questions may be faulty, hence,
here arises the notion of truth; ethics however
is the domain within which we assume
responsibility for our decisions: the antonym
for necessity is not chance (16), it is freedom,
it is choice.
The distinction between decidable and in
principle undecidable questions may be
now sufficiently clear, that I can present to
you the following thesis: "Only those
questions that are in principle undecidable,
we can decide".
Why?
Simply because decidable questions are
already decided by the choice of the
framework within which they are asked.
The frame work itself may however, have
been an answer we chose to an in principle
undecidable question. This observation
sharpens the distinction between these two
kinds of question: answers to decidable
questions are forced through necessity,
while for those to undecidable questions we
have the freedom to choose.
How  do  these  considerations  affect  our
perspectives on cognition, on learning, and on
"Cognition as Learning"? I think in a crucial
way. Here some examples:
Mathematicians dwell in two distinct worlds
that are irreconcilably separated by deciding
differently the in principle undecidable
question "Are the numbers, the formulas, the
theorems, the proofs, etc., of mathematics
discoveries or are they our inventions?".
Here is a report (18) about the way a citizen
of the world of discoveries sees how we know
mathematics: "A deity he fondly calls the
Supreme Fascist has a transfinite book of
theorems in which the best proofs are written.
And if he is well intentioned, he gives us the
book for a moment. Like a medium at a
seance it is said, a good mathematician is one
who is especially adept at communicating
with this Platonic realm where abstractions
and symmetries sit waiting to be discovered
by the properly prepared mind.
And  here  is  the  confession  of  a  citizen
of  the  world  of  inventions  (19):  "I  for
my part believe that what a mathematician
does  is  nothing  but  the  derivation  of
statements  with  the  aid  of  certain,  to  be
enumerated and in various ways choosable,
methods from certain, to be enumerated and
in  various  ways  choosable,  statements  and
all what mathematics and logic can say about
the  mathematicians  activity,...  is  contained
in this simple statement of the state of affairs.
Let us consider children growing up in these
two  different  worlds:  In  the  world  of
discoveries they must learn to repeat what
Revista Universidad Eafit. Julio - Agosto - Septiembre 1997
• 27 •
others were by the Supreme Fascist permitted
to glance from "The Book"; in the world of
inventions they are invited to play a game in
which they write the rules, invent their
mathematics, from which mathematicians
may learn one thing or another (20).
Here another example:
Ever  since  the  French  psychologist  Alfred
Binet  invented  a  century  ago  a  test  for
intelligence,  the  belief  in  the  ability  to  test
for intelligence became very popular indeed,
surprisingly more so in Brittain and in the
United  States  than  in  the  country  of  its
origin.  It  is  therefore  understandable  that
when electronic computers became more and
more sophisticated, the question of whether
these "chaps" are intelligent, and how to decide
whether  they  are,  was  first  raised  by  an
Englishman,  our  friend  Alan  Turing,  the
inventor of the non-trivial machine.
The test he proposed to establish whether or
not computers can "think" has now become
the credo for those who believe in Artificial
Intelligence, or AI. The test consists of having
an "X". which can be a human being or a
computer, placed behind a curtain, and having
examiners bombarding "X", with questions to
find out what is behind that curtain: man or
machine? lf they erroneously conclude "X" is
a human being, or if they cannot decide and
give up, it is said that the computer has tested
positive an the Turing Test, that is, this
computer is intelligent, this computer can
think. AI is justified (16)!
It is always surprising and amusing to me
that it is not plain to everyone that it is not
the machine that has passed the test, but that
it is the examiners who have failed it by
making wrong judgements or by accepting
defeat. This surprises me the more, since the
problem of "The Other Mind", that is, "Are
there  other  minds  besides  me?"  is,  with
a  few  Continental  exceptions,  a  problem
confined   to   the   Isle   (17),   and   those
philosophers  who  pursued  this  problem
would  not  have  accepted  the  Turing  Test
to decide it.
At this point you may have guessed that I
would like you to see "The Other Mind" and
related questions as in principle undecidable,
hence  for  us  to  decide  and  to  take  the
responsibility for our decisions.
lf you have followed me so far, I ask you to
stay with me through the next points, though
they may hurt first before they take shape. I
take the metaphor of seeing the question of
"The Other Mind", that is, "Does X have a
mind?", to  let  the  answers  to  the  questions
"is X incompetent?", "is X a criminal?", "is X
insane?",  etc.,  to  be  seen  as  being  the
responsibility  of  those  who  decide  these
questions:  the  examiners,  the  jurors  and
judges, the psychiatrists, etc.
This points to the ontological trap where
attention  is  placed  on  the  is  in  the
question "is X insane?", instead of directing
the attention to Y who decides (for her or
himself) what "is".
Ontology,  and  objectivity  as  well,  are  used
as emergency exits for those who wish to
obscure  their  fredom  of  choice,  and  by
this  to  escape  the  responsibilty  of  their
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(iv) The  number  of  distinct  non-trivial  machines NS  (X, Y)  that  can  be  synthesized  with S
internal, X input, and Y output states is (23):
N
S
 (X, Y) = YSX,
In  our  case, X=Y=4.
For S=4:
N4 = 4
4x4 = 232 = 4,294,967,296.
decisions.  Here  is  José  Ortega  y  Gassets
observation (21):
"Man does not have a nature, but a history...
Man  is  no  thing,  but  a  drama...  His life
is  something  that  has  to  be  chosen,  made
up  as  he  goes  along,  and  a  man  consists
in  that  choice  and  invention.  Each  man
is  a  novelist  of  himself,  and  though he
may  choose  between  an  original  writer
and  a  plagiarist,  he  cannot  escape
choosing...  He is condemned to be free."
Indeed, we are condemned to be free!
Let us rejoice in this freedom by joining the
chorus in Beethovens Ninth Symphony with
the  new  version  of  Schillers  words  where
"Freude" (joy) is now sung all over the world






(i) The number of ways in which n different
objects can be put into n different boxes,
called permutations is:
Ndiff = n! = 1, 2, 3 . . . . (n-1), n;
In our case, n=4:
Ndiff = 4! = 1, 2, 3, 4 = 24.
(ii) The number of ways in which n symbols
(say, numbers) can  be  written  in  strings
of p places (digits) is:
Nlike = n
p









(iii) The  24  Four-letter  Anagrams  of  A, B,
C, D.
  01 02 03 04 05 06 07  08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16  17 18 19 20 21 22  23 24
 *A A A A A A B  B B B B B C C C C  C C D D D D D D
 *B B C C D D A  A C C D D A A B B  D D A A B B C C
 *C D B D B C C  D A D A C B D A D  A B B C A C A B
 *D C D B C B D  C D A C A D B D A  B A C B C A B A
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9. Gillt A.: Introduction to the Theory of Finite
State Machines, McGraw-Hill, New York
(1962).
10 I was seeing a family when their 6 year old
boy came home from school l/2 hour late and
in tears: "I had to stay over in school"; "Why,
what happened?"; "The teacher said I gave a
fresh answer"; "What did you say?"; "She
asked what is 3x2, and I said 2x3, and
everybody laughed; then she put me in the
corner". Now I interfered: "l think you gave a
correct answer but can you prove it?" At once
he drew on a piece of paper three columns
with 2 dots each and said "Thats 3x2: • • •
• • •
Then  he  rotated  the  paper  90o  and  said
"Thats 2x3.": • •
• •
• •
11. Von Foerster, H.: "Objects: Tokens for (Eigen-)
Behavior" in Observing Systems, Intersystems
Publications, Seaside, 273-286 (1984).
12. Buber,  M.:  Das  Problem  des  Menschen,
Lambert Schneider, Heidelberg (1961).
13. Gadel, K.. "Ueber formal unentscheidbare
Saetze  der  Principia  Mathematica  und
verwandter Systeme. I Monatsh. Mat. Phys.
38: 173-193 (1931).
14. It came to my ears that significant steps for
a proof of Goldbachs conjecture have been
made. However, I could not confirm this
rumor at the time of writing.
15. von Foerster, H.: "Wahrnehmen wahrnehmen"
in Philosophien der neuen Technologien, Merve
Verlag, Berlin, 27-38 (1989).
16. Searl, J.R., Churchland, P.M., Churchland, P.S.:
"Artificial Intelligence: A Debate", Scientific
American, 262: 25-39 (January, 1990).
For S=24:
N24 = 4
24x4 = 2192, or about 6.3 x 1057.
For S=256:
N256 = 4
256x4 = 22048, or about 5 x 10616.
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